Residential Demand Response has emerged as a viable tool to alleviate supply and demand imbalances of electricity during times when the electric grid is strained. Demand Response providers bid reduction capacity into the wholesale electricity market by asking customers to temporarily reduce consumption in exchange for a monetary incentive. This paper models consumer behavior in response to such incentives by formulating Demand Response in a Mechanism Design framework. In this auction setting, the Demand Response Provider collects price elasticities as bids from its rational, profit-maximizing customers, which allows targeting only the users most susceptible to incentives such that an aggregate reduction target is reached in expectation. We measure reductions by comparing the materialized consumption to the projected consumption, which we model as the "10-in-10"baseline used by the California Independent System Operator. Due to the suboptimal performance of this baseline, we show, using consumption data of residential customers in California, that Demand Response Providers receive payments for "virtual reductions", which exist due to the inaccuracies of the baseline rather than actual reductions. Improving the accuracy of the baseline diminishes the contribution of these virtual reductions.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the restructuring of the traditional, vertically integrated energy market towards a competitive market, Demand-Side Management (DSM) has become a viable tool for alleviating supply and demand imbalances of electricity. DSM is motivated by the inelasticity of energy supply, which causes small variations in demand to result in a price boom or bust, respectively. These price fluctuations are aggravated by the inherent volatility of renewable generation resources, their increasing levels of penetration, and the prohibitively high capital cost of energy storage. Since a load-serving entity (LSE) is required to procure electricity at fluctuating prices to cover the demand of its residential households instantaneously and at quasi-fixed tariffs, price risks are almost entirely borne by the LSE. Incentivizing users to temporarily reduce their consumption during periods of high prices therefore partially relays such price risks to customers.
While DSM has attracted a vast array of research across different domains (see [1] for a summary), this paper focuses on the area of Demand Response (DR), where endusers of electricity are incentivized to reduce their demand temporarily, precisely when there is a shortage of electricity supply. Users receive a reward for each unit of reduction, but incur a penalty for increasing their consumption. DR providers (DRPs) bundle these reductions and offer them as a bid directly into the wholesale electricity market, or enter bilateral contracts with load-serving utilities. While DR is traditionally carried out on a commercial level, residential customers are increasingly targeted for load reduction programs. For instance, in California, the Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) launched a "Demand Response Auction Mechanism" (DRAM) in July 2015 [2] to allow DRPs to offer reduction capacity from residential customers directly into the day-ahead electricity market, where they are subject to regular market clearing prices and shortfall penalties.
To make an informed capacity bid into the market, the DRP must take various factors into account, such as the expected Locational Marginal Price (LMP) which determines its market clearing price, the elasticity of users' demand given an incentive, and the number of users under contract. If the DRP bids too much capacity, the aggregate reduction among its user base fails to reach the capacity volume, incurring a shortfall penalty; similarly, a suboptimal revenue arises from too small a bid. The DRP can improve its bidding strategy by learning users' behavior in response to incentives. However, users' preferences are typically private information. To make use of it, we cast this setting as a mechanism design problem, where the DRP as the auctioneer solicits bids from residential customers through an incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism. The idea behind this approach is to increase allocative efficiency, that is, the LSE would like to solicit reductions only from the highest reducers, who are willing to reduce their consumption most in exchange for the lowest possible reward. We design such a mechanism that fulfills these criteria and benchmark its performance against the omniscient case, where user characteristics are common knowledge.
A crucial question that arises is how to measure the reduction of a given user during a DR event, given that only the consumption outcome under a treatment can be observed, but not its counterfactual (the consumption had there been no DR event). This is the fundamental problem of causal inference [3] . Estimating this counterfactual, which we refer to as "baseline" in this context, in the absence of a Randomized Controlled Trial is a modern area of research at the intersection of economics and machine learning. Examples for such baseline estimates can be found in [4] , [5] , [6] . In this paper, we employ the "10-in-10" baseline used by the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) [7] . Using this baseline, the measured reduction for a given user can be formulated as the sum of a virtual reduction, which reflects the baseline estimation error, and the actual reduction due to price elasticity of user demand. We observe that the DRP can achieve a virtual reduction from those users for which the baseline is high. That is, the DRP receives payments for virtual, non-existent reductions which are indirectly paid for by utilities. However, we show that a more accurate baseline diminishes the impact of such virtual reductions.
Related Work
Modeling consumer behavior in response to monetary incentives in DR and their heterogeneity is a growing area of research. In [8] , the authors formulate the problem of targeting the "right" customers for DR as a stochastic knapsack problem in order to achieve a target reduction with high probability. However, users' responses are modeled as a linear model without private user information.
Other works use a contractual formulation between consumers and suppliers in DR settings. For example, [9] designs a DR market where suppliers bid supply curves in the presence of supply shortages to the load-serving entity and analyzes the ensuing market equilibria. In [10] , the authors formulate a contract between an aggregator of buildings, individual buildings, and the electricity market to exploit flexibility of commercial buildings' HVAC consumption.
To quantify the impact of DR signals on the reduction of consumption, [5] , [6] estimate individual treatment effects in response to hourly DR events by comparing the estimated counterfactual consumption to the actual, observed consumption. [11] formulates an optimal treatment assignment strategy to precisely measure the treatment effect of DR.
The application of Mechanism Design on DR is covered in [12] , where the authors maximize the social welfare of consumers and the energy provider by designing a consumption controller with a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction. In [13] , [14] , the authors incorporate uncertainty into consumers' reduction behavior and introduce the notion of reliability for achieving a designated amount of aggregate reduction.
Contributions
Unlike previous works, which model reductions as multiples of unit reductions, we account for the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference [3] into the mechanism design formulation between DRP and users, which is our main contribution. Specifically, we estimate reductions using the CAISO "10-in-10" baseline as the counterfactual estimate. As a consequence of uncertain baseline predictions, virtual reductions arise. Using observational data from residential customers in California, we quantify the extent to which these virtual reductions counteract DR, and how these reductions diminish as baseline estimates become more precise.
Due to space constraints, all proofs are omitted, but can be found in the full version of this paper [15] .
Notation
Let [ · ] + = max(0, ·). Vectors are printed in boldface. Let a −i denote the vector of all components in a excluding i. 1 (·) denotes the indicator function. Figure 1 describes the interaction between the DRP, endusers, the electric utility, and the wholesale electricity market.
II. MARKET PARTICIPANTS AND INTERACTIONS

A. Residential Demand Response
Electric Utility
Wholesale Market
End Users
DR Provider
Payment Electricity Incentives
Reductions
Signal Reductions Fig The DRAM requires electric utilities to acquire demand flexibility from DRPs, which they submit as part of their supply curves as a bid into the real-time wholesale electricity market. If these bids are cleared, the utility sends the DRP a signal to ask for a specified aggregate reduction among its users. The DRP elicits reductions by incentivizing a subset of its customers T ⊆ I with user-specific per-unit rewards
. . , n} denotes the set of users. In exchange for the monetary incentive, users reduce consumption by {δ i ∈ R | i ∈ T }. A per-unit penalty q ∈ R + , which is assumed to be identical for all users and common knowledge, is enforced for an increase in consumption beyond the baseline. Users in the non-targeted group I \T are excluded from the incentive program. In this paper, we focus on the interaction between the DRP and the end-users from the perspective of the DRP. To maximize its profit, the goal of the DRP is to achieve an a-priori defined aggregate reduction with minimal payments to its users.
B. Residential Customers
Each rational, profit-maximizing user i ∈ I is endowed with the "10-in-10" baselinex i ∈ R + employed by the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) [7] , which is an estimate of her counterfactual consumption [16] for a particular hour. For notational ease, we drop time indices, but we emphasize the need to re-calculatex i for any individual hour. The baseline for a particular hour on a weekday is calculated as the mean of the hourly consumptions on the 10 most recent business days during the hour of interest. For weekend days and holidays, the mean of the 4 most recent observations is calculated. User i's measured load reduction δ i , provided she is given incentive r i to reduce during a particular hour, is simply the difference between the baselinê x i and the actual, materialized consumption x i :
Due to the widespread existence of advanced metering infrastructure, the baselinex i is assumed to be common knowledge. The utility of user i is defined as follows:
which equals the payment from the DRP to user i. That is, if the user is under a DR contract with the DRP, she is rewarded with r i ∈ R + for each unit of reduction, and charged q for each unit of consumption above the baselinex i . We model users' consumption in response to r i , denoted with x i (r i ), with a semi-logarithmic demand curve, an assumption frequently made in economics:
In (3),x i ∈ R + and α i ∈ R + are random variables signifying the base demand (the intercept or the consumption with r i = 0) and the slope of the demand curve in log-linear coordinates, respectively. This semi-logarithmic demand curve captures the fact that the amount of reduction is marginally decreasing in the reward r i and saturates. User
and user i's private information.
C. Demand Response Provider
The DRP aims to maximize its profit Π in expectation:
Π is random in δ 1 , . . . , δ n . Δ = i∈I δ i is the total sum of reductions and M ∈ R + the target capacity the DRP has to provide to the utility.r andq ∈ R + denote the per-unit reward and shortfall penalty the DRP is subject to in the wholesale electricity market. Note thatq = q andr = r i . The first term of (4) represents the profit the DRP earns for materialized reductions, the second term captures the shortfall penalty for unfulfilled reductions, and the last term is the sum of payments disbursed to individual customers.
Assumption 1. The DRP is risk-neutral and profitmaximizing.
Assumption 2. The per-unit penaltyq in the wholesale electricity market and the per-unit rewardr are greater than the maximum per-unit reward disbursed to any customer, i.e. min(q,r) > max 1≤i≤n (r i ).
With Assumptions 1 and 2, (4) can be rewritten as follows:
That is, the DRP aims to find an optimal vector of perunit rewards r * that minimizes the expected total amount of payments disbursed to the users while satisfying the constraint that the expected sum of reductions exceeds M .
III. DEMAND RESPONSE MECHANISM
To find an approximation to the solution of (5), the utility needs to elicit user i's private type θ i with an incentive compatible (IC) and individually rational (IR) mechanism. IR guarantees that participation in the mechanism, provided users act rationally, results in an expected payoff that is at least as large as in the case of non-participation (outside option), which is zero in our case (2) . IC is required to ensure that users report their types truthfully to the DRP.
A. Mechanism Design Basics
Let θ denote the collection of types Let S i , . . . , S n denote the strategy spaces of users i ∈ I.
Together they define a mechanism Γ = (S 1 , . . . , S n , g(·)), which transforms users' strategies into a social choice function through the outcome
The revelation principle [17] allows us to focus on direct mechanisms, i.e. S i = Θ i and g(s 1 , . . . , s N ) ≡ g(θ) = f (θ), which is the well-known fact that any equilibrium of any mechanism is identical to an equilibrium of a direct mechanism, provided truthful reporting. We focus on the dominant strategy equilibrium:
Definition 1 (Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (DSE)). A Dominant Strategy Equilibrium is given by
That is, if the supremum of user i's expected utility u i is achieved with truthful reporting s * i (θ i ) = θ i , regardless of other users reports z −i ∈ Θ −i , then the social choice function f (·) is dominant strategy incentive compatible.
B. Timing, User Types, and Reward Calculation
The DR mechanism unfolds as follows:
• The users i ∈ I discover their types θ 1 , . . . , θ n . The baselinesx 1 , . . . ,x n become common knowledge. To model the fact that users' base electricity consumption is often driven by habits rather than rational profitmaximization, we assume the user-specific interceptx i to be drawn from an a-priori defined distribution G with characteristic parameters ξ i encoded in user i's private type. ξ i itself is distributed according to the joint distribution F ξ , and sox i is a compound random variable. The slope, however, is assumed to be explicitly known for each user and drawn from distribution F α . Thus
All distributions have support on R + . We make the following assumption:
User i's expected utility μ i , given the realized types α i and ξ i , allocation d i = 1, and reward r i , is obtained by taking the expectation of (2) w.r.t. the random variablex i ∼ G ξi :
which is strictly monotonically increasing in reward r i , cf.
(2). Letting G denote the CDF of G, (7) for r i = 0 becomes
which is negative. Hence, there is a uniquer i such that μ i (d i = 1,r i ) = 0, i.e. the unique threshold reward level for which user i's expected utility is zero. We approximatẽ r i with Newton's method, exploiting the fact μ i is monotonically increasing in r i . Due to the same property, any reward r i ≥r i fulfills the IR constraint as μ i (d i = 0) = 0 (Eq. 2).
C. Mechanism for Demand Response
We now present the Demand Response Mechanism:
1) Each user announces her private type z i ∈ Θ i to the DRP. In the full version of this paper [15] , we show that this mechanism is incentive compatible, so that users report their types truthfully. Thus, we let z i = θ i . 2) The DRP calculates the uniquer i for each user based on the reports θ i with Newton's method on (7) . 3) The DRP sorts {r i | i ∈ I} in ascending order. Call this sorted set R.
4) The DRP implements the social choice y as follows:
The allocation decision and the reward vector are d = (1, . . . , 1, 0 n−jmax ), (9a) r = (r j(1) , . . . ,r j(jmax) , 0 n−jmax ).
(9b)
In the above mechanism, δ i (r j |θ i ) denotes the expected reduction of user i, given the reward levelr j conditional on truthful reporting z i = θ i , which is computed by taking the expectation on (1) and (3) with respect to ξ i . The mechanism first determines the set of targeted users T by selecting the smallest index j max ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that the sum of expected reductions of users 1 through j max , if each user were given the rewardr jmax , exceeds the desired aggregate amount M (8a). Notice that since the set R is sorted in ascending order,r jmax ≥r i ∀ i ≤ j max . Because μ i (d i = 1, r i ) is strictly monotonically increasing in r i , all targeted users will respond to incentive levelr jmax .
Next, the reward for each user i ∈ T is determined by running the same exact mechanism (8a) on I \ i, i.e. the set of all users excluding i (8b). Denote the user with the largest threshold rewardr j(i) in this new set with j(i). This reward level is then assigned to user i (8c).
In summary, the first j max users (8a) with the smallest threshold rewardsr i are offered user-specific unit-rewards ((8b), (8c)). The remaining n − j max users are not targeted.
Lastly, to ensure that the mechanism returns a valid index j max , we restrict M to the range 0, n−1 i=2 δ i (r n−1 |θ i ) . If M exceeds this range, there are not enough users to achieve expected aggregate reduction M on the given n users.
, the DR Mechanism terminates. The mechanism fulfills the IR constraint. Truthful reporting, i.e. s * i (θ i ) = θ i , establishes a DSE. Since truthful reporting establishes a DSE (Theorem 1), Mechanism I is also IC, due to the revelation principle [19] .
are realizations of continuous random variables, no ties need to be broken in (8a), (8b) and the sorting of the users into R, because identical threshold rewardsr i =r j , i, j ∈ I, i = j, only occur with probability zero.
This mechanism runs in O(n log n) time, as it takes O(n log n) time to create the sorted listR and log n time to determine the correct index j max (8a) with a binary search on all possible values of j = 1, . . . , n. Once j max has been found, O(n log n) time is spent on determining the reward level for each user by running the same mechanism again. Remark 2. This mechanism is motivated by the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism [19] , as it allocates an "items" (in our case reward) to the "highest" bidders (in our case lowest threshold reward levels). 
D. Numerical Example
IV. EFFECT OF BASELINE "GAMING"
By expanding user i's reduction of consumption (1),
it becomes clear that the measured reduction δ i of user i is comprised of two components: δ BL i , which captures the difference between the baselinex i and the base consumption (i.e. the consumption with no reward), and the actual reduction δ r i due to the elasticity of user i in response to the reward level r i . δ BL i is a "virtual reduction", which, if positive (negative), represents the amount of falsely measured reduction (increase). From an economic perspective, δ BL i > 0 results in falsely allocated credit from the utility to the DRP as well as from the DRP to users i. On the contrary, δ BL i < 0 is synonymous with a misallocated monetary transfer from user i to the utility as well as from the utility to the DRP proportional to the amount of |δ BL i |. To diminish the effect of virtual reduction, the baseline estimates should become as precise as possible. We make the following assumption: Assumption 4 excludes the possibility of baseline manipulation [20] , which captures the fact that users can inflate or deflate their baseline, given the knowledge of future DR events, in order to increase their calculated reduction δ i (1). For example, a user can increase her expected utility (2) for a DR event by consciously over-consuming prior to the DR event so as to increase the baselinex i , which results in a higher payment r i · [x i − x i ] + , despite having a zero actual reduction δ r i . However, as DR events are difficult to forecast, the mild assumption that users do not consciously manipulate their baseline justifies Assumption 4, that is, users consume independently of the past and the future.
Averaging 10 recent observations for weekdays (or 4 for weekends and holidays), excluding hours of past DR events, results in an unbiased estimate of the mean consumption x i , but with considerable variance around x i . From a theoretical perspective, the baseline estimate approaches zero variance as the number of previous observations to estimatex i goes to infinity, due to the Central Limit Theorem and Assumption 4. In the next Section, we simulate the effect of more precise baseline estimates on the quantity of virtual reductions δ BL i .
V. SIMULATIONS
We simulate the presented mechanism and the effect of virtual reductions stemming from imperfect baseline predictions, utilizing hourly consumption data from 1,000 residential customers in California. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the hourly base consumptions between 5-6 pm in the absence of DR events of a selected user. The restriction to 5-6 pm is arbitrarily chosen. For a more thorough analysis, we would have to analyze all 24 hours of the day separately. It is found that the base consumptionx i can be approximated with a log-normal distribution, whose density
A. Approximation of Base Consumption
is fully parameterized by the shape σ > 0, scale s = e μ > 0, and location parameter . As (11) has support on ( , ∞), the location denotes the lower bound on the support of the base consumption distribution. Fitting a log-normal distribution to the hourly consumptions between 5-6 pm across all users yields a distribution of the compound statistics ξ i = (σ, s, ), given below:
That is, the shape parameter σ is best approximated with a Gaussian distribution N (μ n , σ n ), the location by a Cauchy distribution parameterized by location c and scale parameter s c , and the scale parameter s by an exponential distribution with parameter λ e . Figure 4 shows the distribution of these compound statistics across all 1,000 users.
B. Performance of DR Mechanism
We compare the DR Mechanism (8a)-(8c) to the hypothetical case of an omniscient DRP, which knows {(α i , ξ i )} n i=1 . Despite this being an unrealistic scenario, it provides a nearoptimal approximation of the minimum payment to users necessary to elicit a target reduction of M . Given the sorted list R of user-specific threshold rewards, the omniscient DRP implements the social choice y o = (d o , r o ) as follows:
That is, the DRP determines the smallest index j o to obtain the desired expected aggregate reduction M (12a) where each user {1, . . . , j o } is given their individual threshold rewardr i (12c). These are the targeted users (12b), (12d).
being publicly known, users are unable to extract information rent from the DRP, which is the payment to the users to elicit their private information [21] . Hence, the DRP can offer targeted users their threshold rewardr i , which keeps users at an expected utility (7) of zero. To guarantee user participation, the DRP has to offer the reward levelr i + ε to each user i ∈ T o , where ε is an arbitrarily small positive number. Figure 5 compares the DR Mechanism (8a)-(8c) to the omniscient allocation with respect to the number of targeted users (left) and the total amount of rewards disbursed (right) on n = 500 users whose parameters ξ i = (σ i , s i , i ) are sampled from the fitted distributions in Figure 4 . As expected, the omniscient allocation is more economical at eliciting a particular aggregate reduction target M due to the lack of private user information, namely about 45% better than the DR mechanism. However, it needs to target more customers as each customer in the omniscient case receives a smaller reward level than in the DR mechanism. Figure 6 shows the total reduction i∈T δ i of all targeted users and its components i∈T δ BL i and i∈T δ r i as a function of M for n = 500 users, q = 5, and elasticities {α i } n i=1 drawn from a uniform distribution with support [0.05, 0.06]. The baseline computed with a particular number x of previous days taken into consideration is calculated as the mean of x randomly drawn samples from the empirical consumption distribution (11 As can be seen from Figure 6 , almost the entire reduction is attributed to the baseline component i∈T δ BL i for small M . With larger values of M , the contribution of i∈T δ BL i decreases marginally and finally starts decreasing. This can be explained by the fact that sorting users in R tends to put users with the highest δ BL i towards the start of the array, while those with the lowest (and negative) δ BL i bunch up at the end of R. Consequently, as more users are assigned to T , the sum of baseline reductions decreases. The actual reduction i∈T δ r i increases exponentially with the number of users targeted, because as more users are assigned to T , the per-unit reward levels also increase, which results in a superlinear growth of i∈T δ r i . For increasing numbers of baseline averaging components, that is, the number of previous days to calculate the baseline, the variance of the baseline estimatex i −x i decreases, and so the virtual reductions decrease. For the limiting case of a perfect baseline, the virtual reductions are zero.
C. Virtual Reductions
Finally, Figure 7 depicts the total amount of payments the DRP has to make to the users for varying baseline accuracies in the range M ∈ [0, 100], where virtual payments have the largest effect (see Figure 6 ). For more inaccurate baselines (fewer number of averaging days), the DRP has to pay users less as it can exploit the virtual reduction component. 
VI. CONCLUSION
We modeled Residential Demand Response with a Mechanism Design Framework where a Demand Response Provider asks a subset of its customers under contract to reduce electricity consumption temporarily in exchange for a monetary reward. Each user's consumption in response to a per-unit reduction incentive is modeled as a logarithmic demand curve where the intercept and the slope are private information of users. While each user has a fixed slope, the user-specific intercept, which corresponds to the consumption given no incentive, is modeled as a realization of a compound random variable, capturing the fact that users often do not consume electricity in a profit-maximizing fashion, but rather follow habits, and hence have no explicit utility function. To achieve an a-priori defined aggregate reduction target M , the Demand Response Provider asks for residential customers' bids to elicit their private information. Reductions are measured against a counterfactual estimate of the consumption in the hypothetical case of no DR event, which in this paper is the "10-in-10"-baseline employed by the California Independent System Operator. Since this baseline is plagued by high variance, the Demand Response Provider can exploit "virtual reductions" emanating from high baseline estimates, which are false-positive reductions despite the users not having reduced, but whose role diminishes as the baseline becomes more precise. The mechanism is validated on hourly smart meter data of residential customers in California.
Our analysis is an initial step towards quantifying economic implications of Demand Response on a residential level. While we approximated users' base demand (i.e. in the absence of incentives) reasonably well with existing smart meter data, the price elasticity of users in response to incentives is unknown, a fact that is complicated by the fundamental problem of causal inference. Thus, to further validate our analysis on real data, credible parameters for users' slope of the demand curve would be necessary.
Lastly, extending the single period analysis in this paper towards a dynamical problem, which allows for baseline manipulation of users, is a logical next step. Comparing the "10in-10"-baseline to improved baseline estimates obtained with more advanced techniques, which exploit serial correlation of consumption time series, would shed further light on the economics of residential Demand Response.
